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ADDRESS
BY,

THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
Anomy GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

8:00 P.M.
FRIDAY, APRIL 9, 1976
ST. PAUL RADISSON HOTEL'

ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA

Mr .. Chie£ Jus tice:
To summarize the views expressed on Topic One is to
add my voice to what is now a thrice told tale.

The organizers

of this conference have taken a leaf from the oldest truth in
education, or

pe~haps

their model is appellate review.

Anyway

they obviously believe in the value of repetition.
I w1ll attempt to describe primary themes, to identify
points in common and differences in emphasis and views.

The

topic itself suggests that courts, or some courrs.may be
engaged in the resolution of disputes they are not well equipped
to resolve. or that other institutions could resolve these kinds
of disputes more efficiently and effectively.

But the

immed~ate

phenomenon of concern is that the number of suits submitted for
judicial resolution has increased dramatically.
it is said litigation has

beco~e

In addition,

increasingly complex.

Taken

togethett- . all .panetists agreed that at some point the torrent
and complexity of litigation may prevent courts from devoting
to those matters, as to which their exercise of judgment is
criticial. the necessary attention and care.

Indeed it is

suggested that increasingly courts are finding it difficult
to aet in their bese tradition.

For

exampl~

they are not

alowing oral argument; they are deciding frequently
op~nions.

witho~t

I believe all would agree that the courts exemplify

the rp.8soning tradition,of the appli,cation of standards to
p~rticular situation~_ and'do this in a

way, as the Solicitor

. General said, that there is an accountability which comes at
least from explanation.
Because of the volume of suits and their complexity,
d,lays in the administration of justice have occurred.

Judge

aifkind~said

that for same plaintiffs in some kinds of cases,

~elaying

effect of litigation may be the primary, perhaps

the

\

the sole, reason for filing suit - simply to delay and impose
expense on' the other party.

As

Judge Higginbotham emphasizes

in his paper, delay in litigation adversely affects not only
the, litigants, but also others - witnesaes and jurors - who <
-become involved in the

sy~tem.

Delay may allow the commission

of further crtmes or illegal actions by the defendant.

Another

consequence of delay and of the expense of complex litigation,
Professor Sander wrote, is that potential litigants may be
driven to avoidance; that is, to withdraw from situations likely
to create disputes,that can be resolved only by resort to the
courts.
costs.

Such avoidance may entail heavy social or individual
Several speakers emphasized that costs and delays

discourage potential plaintiffs from attempting to get redress
for legal wrongs.

Contributing to the number and complexity of suits
is the change in the use of the courts.

It was suggested

the traditional model of the judicial process - a dispute
between two parties resolved through the adversary system
with an allocation of the burden of proof and with the
judgment d.irectly affecting only the immediate parties:- has,
in subs·tant!al measure, collaps.ed.

Courts now often are

engaged, not in dispute resolution in this traditional sense •
.

,

but in what J:udge Rifkind termed "problem solving. n
~ay

This

be in part the result of the attempt to carry the burden

af multiple litigation.

Dean Griswold suggested the basically

wise provisions for class actions may have been overextended.
The tendency, perhaps the necessity, of dealing with disputes
en masse and of providing mass remedies can profoundly affect
the reality of the substantive law and its evolution.

According

to one account, this tendency has led, for example, to
practical eltmination of the reliance element in securities
class actions; it has also led, I suggest, to the development
of remedies like affirmative action in employment, imposed
originally as an evidentiary device to compel compliance with
anti-discrimination decrees. but now perhaps a measure of the
substantive wrong itself •

The "problem solving" model

ot the judicial process

was related not only to the mass-parties mass-remedies
phenomenon, but also to the kinds of issues courts are called
on to resolve.

Courts have become, Judge Rifkind said, "jacks

of all trades," dealing with extended variants of what Professor
Sander termed "polycentric problems," which can implicate wide
ranging social and economic interests not' fully or, conceivably,
at all represented by the adversaries in court.
Procedural and .substantive changes may be essential
if the courts are to be effective and efficient.

But the

question then is the 'cost of what has been given up and whether
other remedies are available.

This is of course true of all

the remedies suggested.
The vast growth in the dimensions and subjects of
governmental concerns is undoubtedly among the chief causes
of the increase in the volume of judicial bU$iness.

The

expansion of governmental concern may be in part the product
of the decline in private institutions -- the

c~'~~h, ~h~

family, and the community were mentioned; one might add the
schools

that once imparted values and so controlled conduct.

one of the consequences of that decline may have been the
increase in the rate of crime, a phenomenon which unquestionably
has played a major part in the burden on the courts.

There has been an increasing turning to the courts
by the legislature.

Not only have new categories of legal

obligations been confided to the courts for 'enforcem~nt, but
obligations come surrounded with legislative indefiniteness.
The turning to the courts is evidenced in the legislative
use of the courts as a means of monitoring the activities
of the executive by insisting on judicial review, and through
the device of private litigation against government, encouraged
by both .the courts and. the legislature, to attempt to ensure

conformity with a vague legislative will or to give new .
substance to individual rights.
Pound recognized the need for new governmental instru
mentalities and social action in his remarks seventy years ago.
Pound spoke, as Judge Higginbotham reminded. of the courts'
posture, then, in thwarting legislative

atte~ts

to remedy

social and economic injustice - a posture altered only through
the long history of legislative effort and judicial reappraisal.
All three panelists emphasized that the situation, whatever the
4issatisfaction with the administration of justice may be. is
vastly different today; they differ somewhat in their appraisal
of the present and. indeed of the past.

All would recognize,

I suppose, that. the courts today have not stayed legislative

)

reform, at least in the areas of concern to Pound; the, have
not in. the same sense created a void equivalent to a no-man's
land for social regulation

o.

lut new constitutional rlghtsdo ban certain kinds
of legislative action; traditional and present doctrines do
, ban sOl1\8' legis.lat1vely attempted remedies.

Referring to

these rights and doctrines, Judge Higginbotham suggested that
Pound, in important respects, overlooked injustices, which should
have been recognized as causes of dissatisfaction.

Judge

Higginbotham described, in particular. the legal development
between Pound's time and our own, in the fields of race relations
&~d

the rights of women and voters.

His point was that the

courts, 'in upholding or ratifying state actions and attitudes
that denied fundamental rights. participated in creating the
conditions that have since taken extended efforts, including
those

~f

the judiciary, to remedy.

.

Several speakers emphasized

the growth in the use of the courts as mediators between the
government and individuals or groups, and observed that the
courts now have moved to fill voido created by the default or
failure of other governmental institutions -- particularly
the failure to r.espond to the demands of individual rights
or to take positive steps to achieve social justice.

At this

pOint one must recognize that concepts are slippery -- one
agency's determinations may be viewed by another as default.
The question cuts deep.

It raises the issue of ultimate

responsibility.
Another kind of legislative lapse was described -

the failure to take steps to rel:1l0ve from the courts, through
appropriate changes and simplification of the substantive
law, categories of disputes where judicial resolution is now
unnecessary to the public

in~erest.

It was suggested that

there has been a comparable failure by the courts to take
sufficient steps, when they can, to simplify procedures and
also to establish clear substantive rules that, as Dean
Griswold said, could be administered elsewhere. including
in the lawyers' offices where understanding and explanation
are essential to the system.

Moreover, as audge Rifkind

said "when law is so unpredictable that it ceases to function
as a guide to behavior, it is no longer law'."

Lack of clarity

in the scope and application of the la1;1 is one of the primary
generators of disputes.
In short, the speakers described a spreading judiciali
zation of

re~ationship3,

the

enlar~ement

of the use of

governmental power to control and channel private activity;

the concomitant increase in the

necess~ty

of creating and

enforcing limitations on that power, and the increased use
of the courts as the instruments to those ends.

We are in

what Grant Gilmore has termed a "romantic period" of the law's
development, a period of instability about its reach, content,
and dimensions.

Perhaps it is right to say that the expansion

in the law and in use of the courts is a mark of judicial
success and that dissatisfaction came not because judicial
decision was too often invoked, but, (because of delays and
expense,) it could not be invoked often enough.
Judges, particularly under the rule of constitutional

.

:,1
:~

judicial review and the American tradition, are, in a special
sense, law makers:

They always have been.

Access to the courts,

in comparison with so much of the rest of government, is relativelY
easy.

The court can be the target or focus for action, and

that they are.

"'

Lawyers often find that target a more attractive

one than efforts to reach other law making bodies.

The courts

can be compelled or at least are willing to decide complex issues

.
~~

as a matter of law or right, in circumstances in which the
legislature or executive has avoided or deferred decision,
because the legislature or executive has determined that the
data for decision are unavailable, or has decided governmental
action should not reach that far.

At the same time the judicial remedy may raise
expectations and generate dissatisfaction when the expectation
is not fulfilled.

Indeed dissatisfaction may result even when

the expectation is fulfilled in this way.

If we move from

a consideration of the most effective administration of
justice to an inquiry into the sources of dissatisfaction,
then 1 think we have to admit we are in an area where the
creation of some remedies, or the way they are created, may
spread feelings of dissatisfaction.

It is one thing to improve

by legislation the social organization of the state; it is
another thing to accomplish reform by a court-created constitutional
condemnation of prior behavior as violative of the fundamental
rights of man.

This does not mean the condemnation has not been

properly given; it does mean that a powerful weapon has to
be used with care.
The conference, 1 believe, came quickly to a realiza
tion there was no one overall cure which should be used to
answer the problem of the overcrowding of the courts, and the
attendent issues of the costs of litigation, a possible decline
in judicial standards, and thus a change in the quality of
justice.

As part of the answer, Judge Rifkind and Professor

-

Sander focused on an analysis of the nature of the judicial
process and

a~

identification of its distinctive features.

On the basis of this traditional model. it was suggested that

the jurisdiction of courts be preserved for those· disput'es
that they have historically handled best -- the resolution
'Of conereta disputes where the law is unclear.

By contrast.

where the task is largely minis'terial or routine , involving
the repetitive application of settled prinCiple, then some
other form of dispute resolution mechanism should be substituted"
~hrough

this allocation, the courts would retain their primary

role as 'a formulator of positive law.
The second prinCiple to guide reform was that courts
should continue as the protector of basic constitutional or
human rights.

Judge Higginbotham and others placed primary

emphasis on this point. noting that individual rights would
go

unpr~tected'if'courts

.w.ere to be removed from this area.

They called for an inquiry as to whether proposed reforms
might work to the disadvantage of the poor, the weak, and the
powerless.

I think it is correct to say that other panelists,

commentators, and small group spokesmen expressed agreement
with the point.

Although dOllbts were expresBed about the

~tence"

resources or remedial powers of courts to run mental hospitals,

schools' or welfare departments, there'was consensus that
courts cannot decline jurisdiction where serious denials of
constitutional rights are at issue.

The example repeatedly,

mentioned was Judge Jolmson I s order in the Wyatt case placing
the mental health system of the State of Alabama under the
"

,

8uperv.ision of 'the federal court.
, There is tension among the criteria presented for'
judicial reform.

There is doubt about the courts' competence

or authority to become a problem-so,lver for society and a
desire that courts confine themselves to their traditional
role..

At the same'time, there is great reluctance to deny

access to the courts, or to deny protection of rights when,
as it is said, other institutions have defaulted.

The tension

is understandable, But the dilemma of what happens oc.,-hen the
theory meets an actual situation seems to p'oint to a 'defect
in our governmental structure.
Several speakers addressed the most obvious solution
to the problem of court
..judges.
nized.

o~lerload

-- increasing the nuai':Jer of

An immediate need for additional judges was recog

Professor Johnson described the relatively low

investment in judicial resources in this country. compared
to other industrialized societies.

But the view was expressed

~hat

increasing the number of judges could not be a long-

range solution to the problem.

It is difficult to find a

sufficient number of judges qualified by experience.. ' intelli
gence, and judgment to perform the demanding task of a judge;
increasing the number of judges will affect their prestige,
making

~t

more difficult to persuade outstanding lawyers to

accept the great responsibility and lower salary of judiCial
office,

~ven

though the point was made, as I recall, that

judges were paid more than some physicists)

A decline in

prestige of judges may also affect the respect in which their
decisions are held by the general public.

An effort must be made to achieve greater clarity and
simplification in the law.

Judge Rifkind commented on the

excessive complexity of laws relating to securities, antitrust,
and taxation.

Much could be done to reduce the caseloads of

courts if legislation were more carefully drafted, or if the
operation of legal rules were simplified.

A more mechanical

legal rule would also allow disputes to be resolved by a clerk
or some other non-judicial mechanism.
Another approach would be to adopt new ways to deal
with certain social problems' to remove the 'need for judicial

resolution.
to personal

Several speakers advocated the no fault approach
inju~y

claims, and suggested the extension of

workmen's compensation laws to cover seamen and railroad
workers.

At times it was suggested that all negligence cases

be removed from the court system, on the stated theory tnat an
alterna~lve

was available' and that accidents were a necessary

risk of' our society.

Perhaps I may be permitted to remark

it 'was this recognition, of the risk as well as a belief in the
effect of responsibility which created the law of negligence in
the first place.

Another possibility, mentioned by Judge

Rifkind, is the British practice in handling corporate take
over disputes.

The divorce laws. and the attendant laws,

governing alimony and property settlement, were also identified
as possible areas for simplification.
that do not warrant governmental

Finally, there were areas

interventi~n

at all.

It was

sugges'ted that "decriminalization" should be considered for
certain "victimless" crimes, such as drunkenness, prostitution,
and gambling.

It was questioned whether such behavior is still

an appropriate subject for governmental regulation, or at least
for regulation by the courts.
Procedural reforms were proposed, including the way
the issues in a case might be sorted out and priority given.
The inc'reased use of alternate dispute-resolving mechanisms
was emphasized.

Mediation and conciliation were thought by

Professor Sander to be especially appropriate for disputes
that arise in long term relationships.
use of ombudsmen.

He also suggested the

Special emphasis was given to arbitration 

a form of adjudication, but more informal.

Indeed, there was

a suggestion that arbitration clauses in contracts be required.
,Screening devices were discussed as means to fllter out
frivolous cases or to encourage settlement at the
court process.

8~a~t

of the

Some of these devices involve the allocation

of litigation costs.

Judge Rifkind, for example. mentioned

the English practice of imposing the expense of attorneys'
fees on the losing party, but noted that our history is opposed
to such a rule.

Other devices involve the requirement of

posting a bond for defendant's costs.

Professor Sander

described the Massachusetts system for medical malpractice
cases under which a plaintiff. before being allowed to proceed
further in the court process, must convince a three-man board,
composed of a doctor, laWyer and trial judge, that his claim
has "prima facie" merit or, failing that, post bond for the
defendant's costs.

Professor Sander also described the Michigan

Mediation System, under which a panel of a judge and two
lawyers determines damages in, tort cases in which liability is
acknowledged.

If the plaintiff or defendant refuses to settle

for that figure determined by the panel, he is taxed for
Qosts and attomey.'.s fees. unless the judgment is substantially
more favorable to him than the panel's estimate.

Judg~

Rifkind

suggests that a civil litigant be required initially to show·
"probable merit" in his claim before thacase proceeds to

lengthy discovery and trial.
of gates

~raditionally

He also mentiQned the

va~iety

used, although perhaps somewhat

battered) to exclude some would-be litigants from the court
house.
It was recognized that these screening devices are
in tension with the. notion of free access by aggrieved citizens
to the courts.

Care must be taken to ensure that a screening

device does not work to exclude individuals for adventitious
reasons.

The importance of judicial resolution. to society

as well as.the litigant, may have no relationship l.,.hatever to
the size of the claim.
point:

Professor Sander added the further

The creation of alternative dispute resolution

mechanisms may result in an actual increase in the number of
disp~tes

to be resolved governmentally.

The availability of

thase mechanisms, including those non-coercive in nature, may
serve to'''validate tl claims.

This may induce individuals to

in'tloke the mechanisms even in cases where private negotiation

and compromise would eventually have produced a resolution
iatisfactory to the parties.

The very availability of

alternate dispute resolution mechanisms may result in more
disputes to be processed, if not by the courts, then at least
by loveromental
institutions.
,

I assume there may be respon

sibility, which ought to be thought about, for creating less.
not more. disputes in our society.

There is another side to

this, but I do not think the question is an easy one.
Dealing with the particular problems of the federal
judiciary,' several speakers advocated elimination or reduction
of diversity jurisdiction and use of three-judge courts.

The

Solicitor General proposed a novel system of special or admin
istrative courts to deal with the large volume of repetitive
cases that arise under certain federal legislation.
Several
speakers' agreed that .a major part of the
.
.o~ution

to the problem of court overload lies in. encouraging

the legislative and executive to remedy their defaults, which
have led to judicial

inte~ention,

and to change the manner in

which they respond to difficult social and economic problems.
In Judge Rifkind's words, "the courts should not be the only
place in which justice is administered."

The difficulty,

however, is that if the government is involved, as it has been

in the recent past, then the courts are likely to be involved.
Perhaps what is intended is an emphasis on those solutions

which can be carried out ministerially, or on greater reliance
on the private sector in response to new rules. or on statutory
revision which itself clarifies existing legislation or does
•
away with
abuses.

From the description of the points made, the ideas
advanced in yesterday's discussion, one point is evident.
The discussion, like the topic, touched on an enormous range
of phenomena.

The phenomena and the problems ,undoubtedly

vary, from the

fe~eral

states.

system to the states, and among the

In the description of the problems, we may be giving,

as Professor Nader suggested, only a soft look.
soft; we should look for better.

The data are

As Professor Nader

however. it is not easy to get the data.

kn~fs,

The softness may

extend to assumptions of judicial success, as well .as failure,
to public satisfaction as well as dissatisfaction.
. Perhaps Dean Pound was right in his suggestion, seventy
years ago. that the growth of government action was the

inevi~able

consequence of au advanced and increasingly interdependent society.
generating

and

accelerating the devel.opte1t of wt Dean Pound teJ:med Hebe

collectivist spirit of the age."

In

m~ny

cases, the

ha.s proved to be an instrument of progress, and its

govern~cnt

intet'V~ntion

has beeu necessary to the resolution of complex social and
eeonomic problems.

1 think there would also be agreement, however, that·
•

Qot all.pects of modern society or individual action are
best controlled.by the government.

Many of the great injustices

in our history were caused or confirmed by governmental action.
The assumption that government by its nature will inevitably
be an instrument of good, or that its judgments liill always
be wise, is not the necessary product of experience.

So, too,

our history disproves the notion that private institutions
cannot also be effective agents of progress and justice.

That

there are areas where progress is accomplished non-governmentally
is a thought that comes easily. if I may be'permitted to say
this, to the former president of a private university.

Diversity

and creativity have at least an alternative home in the private
sphere.

When the

P~esident

of Columbia University says to this

group, not entirely in jest, that he has been sued frequently
for doing his duty,

~e

is making this point.

1 believe we must recognize that courts can become,
not agents of p'rogress, but an obstruction to progress.
Judicial entry into,an area previously

reser~ed

to the legis

lature may displace the lzgislature as the primary formulator
of social.policy.

,,'

Professor Nader's soft data point bears

on 'the formation of rights and remedies.

Change on many fronts

must be tentative, experimental-qualities that can characterize
legislative solutions.

Constitutional rules move much more in

the realm of the absolute.

Moreover. the effect of judicial

assumption of these responsibilities can be that the legislature
and executive will refrain from serious discussion and decisive
action with the risk-taking which responsibility imposes.

Where

the decisions are difficult, there is always the temptation to
avoid confronting them, to let that responsibility pass to others.
Even where there is the possibility for legislative and executive
resolve, the "freezing effect" of the constitutional rule
imposed by the courts may' frustrate an effective response by
these institutions.
Responsible democratic government has a duty to articu
late our gQals as a society, although certainly not all the
goals for private individual or even for all collective action.
In a special way, courts share in that governmental responsibility.
The mission of courts involves not only the resolution of disputes

but also the explication of the general principles that inform
decision.
~eaning

Those principles are grounded in law, but their

is often

an<~volving

one, influenced and

the changing circumstances of their application.
of the j

ud~cial

•

sh~ped

by

t~
<,
:to,

The nature

process requires that courts proceed with care, .

<

<#

.through' articulated reason, in applying these general principles,~
and rules.

The process of change is slow, interstitial, in the

,~

~
.'~~

Dshion of an artist creating a great mosaic, as Judge Rifkind
described it.

These

q~alities

are important. for they are the

~

qualities of a reasoning society, which ours is supposed to be.

~

To demonstrate and exemplify this is an important role for our

1l<;;j

courts.

.~

Change, of course, does not always come this way in

the courts.

~

Constitutional law. while it is a great common law,'~

,~

sometimes has more abrupt and decisive turns";

Yet, an important

~

.~

reason for the respect in which courts are held is the

perceived'~

constancy of the prinCiples which govern them and which they

l(1

"

~

.~

apply.

~,~

The present reality, as described by the panelists, is

;l
AI

that the courts are now deluged with business.

It may well be

that courts are no longer able to discharge their traditional
function but will be required instead to assume
If so, the loss will be great.

Courts are like other

institutions in American life; they share the commitment to
att~~pt

to achieve appropriate excellence.

There are times,

however. 'tv-hen the nature and processes of institutions must
change becnuse their responsibilities must change.

This has

been the case with other institutions in American life and
it may ~lso be the case with the courts.

It is possible. after

all, to conceive of courts as mini-legislatures.

But if courts

are to function as mini-legislatures, then they must adapt to
the requirements of the political process.

Public opinion and

political responsibility inevitably become important factors
in the decision-making process.

This

is

always the case, but

the change will make the courts more vulnerable, and their
service to the country will be of a different kinQ.

One has

to weigh the costs.
Dean Pound observed the defieiencies in American juris
prudential theory.

He created a jurisprudence of interests that

took into account the ideal of social engineering.

A major

difficulty today has been the lack of discussion within society
as to the basic problems we face.

Our political institutions

have often placed a premium on ambiguity in policy formulation,
an ambiguity which is itself a cause of our present dissatisfaction.

The responsibility thereby placed on courts·-to discover and
implement social policy-is certainly difficult if not intoler
able.

There is an exigent need for our other institutions -

and not only governmental -- to clarify paramount issues and
to develop remedies which work with least social cost.

If

the courts are to become problem solvers, and not dispute
solvers, then perhaps one has to think of new kinds of coopera
tive inter-relationships among the courts and other agencies,
governmental and private. which would be improper or strange '
if courts maintained their traditional role.
t feel compelled to note that our society presently

,finds dissatisfaction a powerful motive force.

Ironically.

it finds a certain satisfaction with dissatisfaction.

The

panelists have been eloquent on some of the matters to be
dissatisfied or at least worried about.

There is some

reassurance in knowing that we are not complacent.

There

18 great wisdom in having the opportunity to rethink our

direction, although the nature of government often makes that
process difficult.

There is always'the danger that the purpose

of reassessment will be misunderstood. It is ~egrettable that
world is such that proposals ~or judicial reform today ~t
be followed by the disclaimer that the proposals are not a
suggestion tha·t deprivations of, human rights be cotmtenanced.

They should not be.

Courts must continue to be, as they have

been in the past, indispensable prosecutors of our basic
freedoms.

They have accomplished much, and they are highly

regarded for that work.

But the problems we face as a society

are often not susceptible of judicial resolution.

To rely on

the courts alone, or even primarily, for the solution to our
problems may itself be to countenance our eventual default,
as a people, in our commitment to the establishment and
preservation of equal justice for all.

